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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
CARITABrE SUBSCRIPTIONS - ENFORcaBILITY - CommoN-
LAw CoNsiDERATIoN.- D's decedent, "in consideration of contri-
butions and gifts to be made by others to the endowment and equip-
ment funds of Wesleyan University", agreed to give to the trustees
of the University giftg ta the amount of eighty-nine thousand dollars,
to be applied toward the endowment, in the name of decedent's
father, of a Chair of Economics and Social Science. Decedent's
executors later executed a note for the unpaid portion of the pledge.
The personalty being insufficient to satisfy the note, suit was
brought to subject the decedent's specifically devised realty thereto.
Held, two judges dissenting, that under the present state of the
pleadings and evidence the subscription is unenforceable. Wes-
leyan University v. Hubbard.1
Charitable subscriptions have been a prolific source of litigation,
their enforceability usually being questioned upon the ground of
insufficiency of consideration.2 Those courts which have enforced
such pledges resort to various arguments, some tending toward the
unorthodox, in order to find consideration where in ordinary cir-
cumstances by the general law of contracts there would be none.3
There are four theories sustaining enforceability, three of which
support the sufficiency of consideration, and one of which dispenses
with the necessity for it.4 Three of these approaches are recognized,
expressly or impliedly, in the instant case.
Some cases have held that the promises or performances of
other subscribers are consideration for the promise under scru-
tiny.5 The court in the present case, while unable to find in the
record that other gifts were promised or made, implies that if
promised or made they would have constituted sufficient considera-
tion for the pledge in question. The case was remanded with leave
to amend the bill. The dissenting opinion finds that other subscrip-
tions were actually paid, and submits that the subscription under
review should be held enforceable on that ground. In the usual
/ '.20 S. E. (2d) 677 (W. Va. 1942), Rose, J., dissenting, and Fox, J., con-
curring.
Note (1933) 39 W. VA. L. Q. 159.
3 See Allegheny College v. National Chatauqua County Bank of Jamestown,
246 N. Y. 369, 372, 159 N. E. 173, 174 (1927).
4 Billig, The Problem of Consideration in Charitable Subscriptions (1927) 12
CoRN. L. Q. 467.
5Watkins v. Eames, 9 Cush. 537 (Mass. 1852); Higert v. Trustees of In-
diana Asbury University, 53 Ind. 326 (1876); University of Southern Cali-
fornia v. Bryson, 103 Cal. App. 39, 283 Pac. 949 (1930).
1
V.: Charitable Subscriptions--Enforceability--Common-Law Consideratio
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1942
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
case, as here, the promise is made to the charity, not to the other
subscribers, and neither induces, nor is induced by, the other
promises. To regard such promises as being consideration for each
other is the result of fallacious reasoning.6
More justifiable is the view that the subscription is a continuing
offer, to ripen into a binding contract upon the performance, or
upon the beginning of performance, of the acts which the subscrip-
tion contemplates.7  Similar to this view is that adopted in the
istant case, the pledge being regarded as a continuing offer to be-
come binding upon the procuring by the University trustees of
additional pledges, or upon the establishment by them of the chair
requested. s Upon the face of the written subscription, however,
there is no such express request to the trustees, and this interpreta-
tion can prevail only upon a request found by implication. Even
were this conclusion supportable, the continuing offer would be
revoked upon the death of the subscriber, if not acted upon prior to
that time."
A third theory employed in the quest for consideration is
sometimes found in a counter-promise of the charity or its trustees,
implied by acceptance of the pledge, to administer and apply the
funds promised according to the terms of the subscription." This
reasoning is expressly adopted in the dissenting opinion of the
present case. Whether or not such a promise may properly be
found by implication, it is yet a questionable proposition that it
is given in exchange for, and in consideration of, the promise in the
pledge."
Perhaps the most satisfactory doctrine upon which enforce-
ability may be sustained is that of promissory estoppel.1 This
doctrine does not purport to find a common-law consideration, but
operates in substitution thereof. Some decisions have sustained en-
6 See Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379, 386, 24 S. Ct. 107,
4S L. Ed. 229 (1903). See HOLMES. THE COMMoN LAw (1881) 293.
7 Keuka College v. Ray, 167 N. Y. 96, 60 N. E. 325 (1901); Robinson v. Nutt,
185 Mass. 345, 70 N. E. 198 (1904); University of Pennsylvania's Trustees v.
Coxe's Exr's, 277 Pa. 512, 121 Atl. 314 (1923).
8 Washington Heights Methodist Episcopal Church v. Comfort, 138 Mise.
236, 246 N. Y. Supp. 450 (1930).
9 1 WILLISTON CONTRACTS (1936) § 62 and § 116, at page 405.
lo Barnett v. Franklin College, 10 Ind. App. 103, 37 N. E. 427 (1894);
Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown, 246 N.
Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173 (1927); Tioga County General Hospital v. Tidd, 164
Misc. 273, 298 N. Y. Supp. 460 (1937).
"11 WILLISTON, CONTRACTs § 116.
12 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 90.
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forceability on this ground,1 3 and the doctrine has been applied in
West Virginia, 4 although not recognized by name. In concluding
that subscriptions not based upon a common-law consideration, of
benefit to the promisor or of detriment to the promisee, are unen-
forceable, the court cites the case of Banner Window Glass Co. v.
Barriat.5 It is doubtful that this conclusion is a repudiation of
the doctrine of promissory estoppel as applicable to pledges, since
neither in that case nor in the present one do the facts fall suf-
ficiently within the scope of the doctrine to render it applicable."
Falling generally within the third category enumerated is the
suggestion in the dissenting opinion that the pledge is supported
by a counter-promise to establish the chair, thereby forming a
bilateral contract. But the consideration expressed on the face of
the pledge is promises or performances of other parties. It is
doubtful that parol evidence is admissible to establish that the real
consideration is a promise other than that recited in the written in-
strument." The subscription might as easily be regarded as a gift
upon a condition, viz., that the trustees establish the chair. A con-
dition in itself is not a consideration. 8
It is an interesting observation that the rule as stated in the
syllabus by the court reads as follows: "A written pledge to make
future contributions to an institution of learning w1tick does not
show plainly on its face the purpose to become legally bound is un-
enforceable unless shown to be based upon a common-law considera-
tion." Both opinion and syllabus ignore the fact that the parties,
by reciting a consideration in the pledge, whether or not fictitious,
recognized the necessity therefor in order to form a legally binding
"3 School District of Kansas City v. Sheidley, 138 Mo. 672, 40 S. W. 656
(1897) ; In re Estate of Drain, 311 Ill. App. 481, 36 N. E. (2d) 608 (1941).
14 McKinney v. Rhinehart, 102 W. Va. 531, 135 S. E. 654 (1926). See RE-
STATEMENT, CONTRACTS, W. VA. ANNOT. (1937) § 90.
15 85 W. Va. 750, 102 S. E. 726 (1920). But see 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 116, page 406, n. 10. In this case, A and B mutually agreed to pay to C the
dividends on certain stock owned by A and B. After four years, during which
time performance of the agreement was continued, A refused to permit further
payments. A's promise was held unenforceable for lack of consideration. The
decision appears to be unsupportable, and is criticized in (1920) 27 W. VA.
L. Q. 91.is RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90, defines promissory estoppel as follows:
"A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." There is no evidence in the
principal case that injustice would be done the university by a failure to en-
force the promise.
171 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 115B.
is Id. at § 112.
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obligation. Had the subscriber not intended to be legally bound,
there would have been neither an occasion for, nor point in, reciting
a consideration. It therefore appears that the subscription does
show plainly on its face- albeit not as an express statement-
the purpose to become legally bound. The clause of qualification
in the syllabus, not adverted to in the text of the decision, follows
closely the language of the Uniform Written Obligations Act,19
which has not been adopted by the West Virginia legislature. Does
the syllabus state the law?' If so, it is arguable that the court
has gone far toward adopting the rule pronounced by the Act,
without action by the legislature.
From an examination of the case, it seems that the charitable
subscription was held unenforceable because under the pleadings
and evidence the facts did not fall within the scope of the possible
approaches suggested. It is not clear that in a proper case an
opposite result might not obtain, predicated either upon a common-
law consideration, or upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
The decision cannot properly be considered an absolute rejection
of the enforceability of charitable subscriptions.
It is suggested that the problem of enforceability of charitable
subscriptions might best be resolved by wise legislation designed
both to protect the primary source of income of charitable insti-
tutions, and to preserve from further effacement the orthodox
principles of consideration.
K. J. V.
NEGLIGENCE - RAILROADS - DUTY OWING TRESPASSERS AND
LICENsEE - EFFECT OF EXCEEDING LICENCE. - P's decedent, while
sitting or lying on D's railroad track in an intoxicated and uncon-
scious condition, was struck and killed, at a point commonly used
by pedestrians, by D's coal train as it slowly backed around a
reverse curve. The lookout maintained by the conductor and brake-
man failed to reveal in time the decedent's peril. On appeal from
19 Uniform Written Obligations Act, § 1, quoted in 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 219A as follows: "A written release or promise hereafter made and signed
by the person releasing or promising shall not be invalid or unenforceable for
lack of consideration, if the writing also contains an additional express state-
ment, in any form of language, that the signer intends to be legally bound."
This section is intended to remedy the gap in the law of jurisdictions where
by statute the common-law effect of the seal is abolished.2 Hardman, "The Law - in West Virginia (1940) 47 W. VA. L. Q. 23;
"The Syllabus Is The Law" (1941) 47 W. VA. L. Q. 141; "The Syllabus Is
The Law" - Another Word (1941) 47 W. VA. L. Q. 209.
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